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\ : : : at Weldbend we believe that the way to combat foreign
competition is to invest in the most modern equipment, the most
ecient production methods, and the most dedicated people in
the world { and to treat the customer fairly. We have done all
of these things, and that is why we can compete in the market.
We do not need government help."
{ James J. Coulas, Sr.
President, Weldbend Corporation
from March 9, 1994 response to
ITC summons (U.S. I.T.C., 1995)
The gain from antidumping protection cannot lower prots for rms
which do not import the aected commodity and has enormous upside po-
tential for rms in some industries. But, opposing an anti-dumping petition
can signicantly lower the probability of a positive nding with the atten-
dant duty. Nonetheless, rms which would seemingly benet from a suc-
cessful anti-dumping petition do not always support it, opting instead for a
\neutral" or \opposed" stand, which means they do not support the petition.
For example, in the case from which the introductory quotation comes from,
Weldbend Corporation did not support the petition even though it was the
largest domestic producer in the industry, accounting for about one-third of
domestic production in 1993. In response, the petitioning rms in the in-
dustry argued that Weldbend should be disqualied as a \related party" for
fear that if included in the industry the chances of obtaining tari protection
would be reduced. Nevertheless, the International Trade Commission ruled
that Weldbend was a related party (U.S. I.T.C., 1995, p. I{9, esp. footnotes
27 and 32). Eventually, the Commission also concluded that the foreign
competition was not the cause of injury to the domestic competitors.
At rst face, opposition to an antidumping petition seems odd. If there is
a chance of eliminating some foreign competition, why not do so? Support-
ing an antidumping petition can be more costly than opposing it,1 however,
since it is presumably the higher cost, more marginal rms that seek the
protection, and so bear most of the costs of pursuing the action. It would
thus seem that any other rms which are not so marginal would gain even
more than the lers from industry protection which leads to a price rise.
Of course, it could be that some import-competing rms are also importers
of related components or exporters that fear retaliation abroad. But this
was not so in the case cited above2 and apparently is not so in other cases,
leaving us with a puzzle.
1Non-support can reduce the likelihood of an armative decision in the preliminary
investigation. If the Commission votes armative in the preliminary hearing then all
domestic producers incur further costs.
2On the basis of the investigation record, International Trade Commission found that
Weldbend was not an importer or exporter of the product or the components of the
We propose an explanation of this puzzle based on signaling theory. In
particular we present a model of imperfect competition wherein a low cost
respondent3 can oppose the petition to credibly signal to its rivals that it is
indeed a low cost rm, thus gaining market share at the expense of losing
the benets of tari protection. But it is just this costly loss of protection
that makes the signal so credible. Thus, reminiscent of Gruenspecht (1988)
and as well as more recent examples (e.g., Blonigen, 1999; Prusa, 1992;
Staiger and Wolak, 1992), the mere existence of certain trade laws change
the payo structure confronting rms and thus the nature of their strategic
interactions.
The next Section sets the institutional context with a brief overview of
anti-dumping and countervailing duty procedures. Section II presents the
model and Section III derives the conditions for prot maximization when
the cost structure of one of the rms is private information. Section IV
then investigates equilibria and we establish the conditions for the existence
of a unique signaling equilibrium using the Cho-Kreps notion of Intuitive
Criterion. We then construct an example using linear demand to provide
an illustration of our results. In Section V, we discuss an extension which
allows for rms to communicate, prior to the ling of the petition, and
demonstrate that signaling behavior may be quite prevalent, even if cases
such as Weldbend are rare. In Section VI, we evaluate the robustness of our
results by considering a modication of our model where rms compete in
prices rather than output. Finally, in Section VII, we oer some conclusions.
I The Institutional Context
The GATT, as administered by the WTO, sanctions protective duties for
industries which are confronted with \a product introduced into the com-
merce of another country at less than its normal value." This includes both
\dumping" and \subsidization." If a rm or group of rms in an industry
les a petition, an investigation begins. Now, a positive nding depends
on both nding a margin below fair value and making a determination of
injury. (In the United States the Department of Commerce does the former
and the International Trade Commission the latter.)
It is the injury determination on which we focus. Part I of Article VI
of the GATT speaks to injury and the investigation. The investigators
are required to consider \all relevant economic factors and indices having
a bearing on the state of the industry" and determine that the unfairly
priced imports are indeed the cause of injury to the domestic industry as
product or aliated in any way with a corporate entity that was involved in trading the
product internationally (U.S. I.T.C., 1995).
3Here and throughout the remainder of the text, we use the term respondent to refer
to non-petitioning domestic producer whereas, institutionally, it is frequently used to refer
to the subject importers and foreign producers.
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opposed to the domestic competition of the petitioning rms. In particular,
the investigators are admonished to consider \the degree of support for, or
opposition to the application expressed by domestic producers of the like
product, that the application has been made by or on the behalf of the
domestic industry." Thus, a rm in the industry not at least expressing
support can be quite detrimental to a successful petition.
In the next section we will build on this institutional context by assuming
that all parties are aware that non-support of the petition can be destructive
to a positive nding with the attendant protection.
II The Model
Consider a model of imperfect international competition with two domestic
rms, 1 and 2, facing foreign competition for whom, for simplicity, output
is xed. Assume that the situation is such that rm 2 has led a dumping
petition against foreign producers and that rm 1 can then choose to sup-
port or to oppose rm 2's petition.4 Once rm 1 has decided whether to
support or oppose the petition, the outcome of the dumping investigation is
determined. Finally, rms 1 and 2 compete.
Assume that rm 1's marginal cost, c1, is known only to itself but for
simplicity rm 2's marginal cost, c2, is common knowledge.5 Firm 2's prior
regarding rm 1's marginal cost is that with probability , rm 1 has cost
c1 = cL and with probability 1− , rm 1 has cost c1 = cH where cH > cL.
Let p(Q) be the domestic market inverse demand function. Each rm's
prot is,
i = (p(q1 + q2 + qf )− ci)qi (1)
where q1 and q2 are rms 1 and 2's outputs and qf is the level of foreign
output. Foreign output is exogenously determined and is dependant on the
outcome of the dumping investigation. Assume that the standard strategic
substitutes assumption holds (i.e., @2i=@qi@qj  iij < 0 for i; j = 1; 2 and
i 6= j). Firms maximize prots through their choices of output, given their
expectations.
In the event of a successful dumping investigation, foreign imports are
fully excluded so that qf = 0. If the dumping investigation is unsuccessful,
foreign imports are not excluded so that qf = q > 0.6 The probability of
a successful investigation depends on rm 1's marginal cost and its decision
4In reality, respondents can also take a neutral position (U.S. I.T.C., 1999), however,
for simplicity, we restrict this to a binary choice with the interpretation that neutrality is
equivalent to opposition.
5The essential ingredient to our analysis is that rm 1's cost is private information.
Allowing for asymmetric information on rm 2's cost complicates the analysis but does
not change the basic story.
6Using a simple example (Section IV), we demonstrate that the assumption that foreign
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Figure 1: Pre-competition game tree
over whether or not to be in favor of the petition. If rm 1 supports the
petition then the probability of a successful investigation is γL if rm 1 has
cost cL and γH if rm 1 has cost cH . To be on record as being in opposition
to the petition, we assume, casts doubts on the merits of the case and
therefore has a signicant negative impact on the likelihood of an armative
judgement. Thus we assume that if rm 1 opposes the petition then the
probability of a successful investigation is 0. One of the requirements for an
armative decision in a dumping investigation is that domestic rms should
suer injury due to dumping. Higher cost rms are more likely to be injured
and therefore the probability of an armative decision should be greater.
That is, γH > γL.
Finally, assume the there is some Q such that for Q  Q, p(Q)  cL.
This implies that there will exist some suciently large q such that rm 1
prefers to support the dumping investigation.
The structure of the game is as follows (see Figure 1). In the rst stage,
rm 1 decides whether or not to support the investigation, based on its
cost and its expectations regarding rm 2's behavior. The outcome of the
production is exogenously specied is of no consequence. Using linear demands we show
that our results generalize to allowing for a foreign rm which behaves strategically.
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investigation is then determined by 1's decision whereupon rm 2 updates
its beliefs over rm 1's cost, c1. Finally, rms 1 and 2 compete in output.
III Prot maximization
In equilibrium, rm 1's output is a function of its marginal cost so let qL be
the low cost rm's output and qH be the high cost rm's output. Since rm
1 faces no uncertainty, rm 1's rst and second order conditions are given
by
@t
@qt
= p− ct + qtp0 = 0 (2)
@2t
(@qt)2
 t11 = 2p0 + qtp00 < 0: (3)
for t = L;H.
Given rm 1's rst stage decision and the outcome of the dumping in-
vestigation, rm 2 updates its priors over rm 1's marginal cost. Let these
updated priors be given by .
Given beliefs, , and rm 1's outputs, qL and qH , rm 2 chooses q2 to
maximize
E2 = [p(qL + q2 + qf )− c2]q2 + (1− )[p(qH + q2 + qf )− c2]q2 (4)
where qf = 0 or qf = q depending on the outcome of the dumping inves-
tigation. Firm 2's rst and second order conditions for prot maximization
are
@E2
@q2
= (pL − c2 + q2pL0) + (1− )(pH − c2 + q2pH0)
= 2L2 + (1− )2H2 = 0
(5)
@2E2
(@q2)2
= (2pL0 + q2pL00) + (1− )(2pH0 + q2pH00) < 0: (6)
where pt = p(qt + q2 + qf ), pt0 = p0(qt + q2 + qf ), pt00 = p00(qt + q2 + qf ) and
2t is rm 2's prots if rm 1 is of type t. Given type L and H outputs, qL
and qH , equation (5) denes rm 2's optimal output given its beliefs about
rm 1's costs and equilibrium output. When 0 <  < 1 and qL > qH ,
notice that, by the assumption of strategic substitutes, in order for the rst
order condition to hold, it must be the case that 2L2 < 0 and 
2H
2 > 0.
A second stage equilibrium is thus a triplet qL, qH and q2 such that i)
given q2, rm 1's type contingent output, qL and qH , satisfy equation (2)
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when c1 = cL and c1 = cH and ii) given , qL and qH rm 2's output, q2,
satises (5). Since the outcome of the dumping investigation is determined
prior to competing, the equilibrium values of qL, qH and q2 are functions of
rm 2's beliefs, , and the outcome of the dumping investigation, qf .
Totally dierentiating this system with respect to qL, qH , q2, qf , cL, cH ,
c2 and  yields:
t11dq
t + t12dq
2 − dct + t1fdqf = 0 (7)
2L21 dq
L + (1− )2H21 dqH + (2L22 + (1− )2H22 )dq2
− dc2 + (2L2f + (1− )2H2f )dqf + (2L2 − 2H2 )d = 0 (8)
where 2t is rm 2's prots when facing a competitor of type t. These total
dierentials can be rewritten in matrix form as:0
@ 
L
11 0 
L
12
0 H11 
H
12
2L21 (1− )2H21 2L22 + (1− )2H22
1
A
0
@ dq
L
dqH
dq2
1
A =
0
@ 1 0 0 −
L
1f 0
0 1 0 −H1f 0
0 0 1 −(2L2f + (1− )2H2f ) −(2L2 − 2H2 )
1
A
0
BBBB@
dcL
dcH
dc2
dqf
d
1
CCCCA (9)
and used to derive the following comparative static results:
dqt
dct
=
t
0
11(
2L22 + (1− )2H22 )− t
0t0122t
0
21
D
< 0
dqt
dct0
=
t
0t122t
0
21
D
< 0
dqt
dc2
=
−t011t12
D
> 0
dqt
dqf
=
−t12t
0
11(
2L
22 − 2L2f )− (1− )t12t
0
11(
2H
22 − 2H2f )
D
2 (−1; 0)
dqt
d
=
t12
t0
11(
2L
2 − 2H2 )
D
> 0
dq2
dct
=
−tt0112t21
D
> 0
dq2
dc2
=
L11
H
11
D
< 0
dq2
dqf
=
−H11(L112L2f − L1f2L21 )− (1− )L11(H112H2f − H1f2H21 )
D
2 (−1; 0)
dq2
d
=
−L11H11(2L2 − 2H2 )
D
< 0
(10)
for t; t0 = L;H and t 6= t0 and where t =  if t = L, t = 1−  if t = H
and D = H11(L112L22 − L122L21 ) + (1− )L11(H112H22 − H122H21 ) < 0.
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Thus as is standard, an increase in own costs reduces own output while
increasing rival output. In particular, this implies that qL > qH so that if
 2 (0; 1) then 2L2 < 0 and 2H2 > 0. It follows that an increase in rm 2's
belief that rm 1 is a low cost rm increases output for both high and low
cost rms while it decreases rm 2's output. Finally, an increase in foreign
output, qf , results in a decline in output for all domestic rms.
Now, dierentiating prots with respect to qf and  yields
@t
@qf
= t2
@q2
@qf
+ tf < 0
@t
@
= t2
@q2
@
> 0
@E2
@qf
= 

2L1
@qL
@qf
+ 2Lf

+ (1− )

2H1
@qH
@qf
+ 2Hf

< 0
@E2
@
= 2L1
@qL
@
+ (1− )2H1
@qH
@
+ (2L − 2H) < 0
(11)
That is, an increase in foreign output lowers prots for all domestic competi-
tors so that in the absence of signaling considerations, both types strictly
prefer to support the dumping investigation. However, this is clouded by
the incentive for rm 1 to manipulate rm 2's beliefs. In particular, rm 1
would like to increase  or rm 2's belief that rm 1 is a low cost producer.
IV Equilibria
Pooling
A pooling equilibrium occurs when, regardless of its type, rm 1 either
always supports or always opposes the dumping investigation.
Consider rst the potential equilibrium where both type L and type
H rms always support the dumping investigation. Since rm 2 learns
nothing from rm 1's rst stage action, its only new information comes
from the result of the investigation. In particular, if rm 1 always supports
the investigation then if rm 2 observes a successful investigation, her Bayes
updated belief that rm 1 is of type L is
s =
γL
γL + (1− )γH (12)
and if it observes an unsuccessful investigation, its updated belief that rm
1 is of type L is
u =
(1− γL)
(1 − γL) + (1− )(1 − γH) (13)
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Since, γL < γH , it follows that after a successful investigation in which rm
1 supported the petition, rm 2's believes that rm 1 is of type L with lower
probability than if the investigation were unsuccessful (i.e., s < u).
In an equilibrium where both types of rm 1 support the petition, rm
1's expected prots are given by
Et = γt[p(qt(s ; 0) + q
2(s ; 0)) − ct]qt(s ; 0)
+ (1− γt)[p(qt(u; q) + q2(u; q) + q)− ct]qt(u; q) (14)
where qt(; qf ) is rm t's equilibrium output conditional on rm 2's beliefs
of  and foreign production of qf . A rm of type t compares this to the
prots it would get by deviating and opposing the dumping investigation.
We know that by opposing the petition, rm 1 ensures that the dumping
investigation fails and therefore qf = q. In order to compute the deviation
prots, we must formulate rm 2's out of equilibrium beliefs. Since in equi-
librium, deviations are not observed Bayes rule provides no restrictions on
beliefs. Thus to nd the most favorable conditions for the existence of a
pooling equilibrium, assume that upon observing unanticipated behavior by
rm 1, rm 2 believes with certainty that rm 1 is of type H (i.e.,  = 0).
Firm 1's deviation prots are therefore
t = [p(qt(0; q) + q2(0; q) + q)− ct]qt(0; q) (15)
Given our comparative static results (dt=d > 0 and dt=dqf < 0), this
is clearly the worst possible outcome for rm 1 so that (14) is greater than
rm 1's deviation prots. Therefore, given these beliefs,
Remark 1 There exists a pooling equilibrium where both types of rm 1
support the investigation.
Now consider the potential pooling equilibrium where rm 1 always op-
poses the investigation. In this case, since both types choose the same action
in equilibrium, rm 2 again acquires no new information. Furthermore, since
rm 1 opposes the petition, the investigation always fails and so rm 2 also
learns nothing from the outcome of the investigation and  = . Thus rm
1's equilibrium prots are given by
t = [p(qt(; q) + q2(; q) + q)− ct]qt(; q) (16)
Again, to compute rm 1's deviation prots we must formulate rm 2's
beliefs in the event of observing unexpected behavior. As before, suppose
that upon seeing out-of-equilibrium behavior, rm 2 assumes the worst and
believes with certainty that rm 1 has cost cH so that  = 0. Firm 1's
prots are therefore
Et = γt[p(qt(0; 0) + q2(0; 0)) − ct]qt(0; 0)
+ (1− γt)[p(qt(0; q) + q2(0; q) + q)− ct]qt(0; q) (17)
8
This is a weighted sum of prots where with probability γt, the investigation
is successful and with probability 1 − γt, the investigation is unsuccessful.
In the event of a failed investigation, rm 1's prot (the second term of the
right hand side of (17)) is dominated by (16). However, if the investigation
is successful, rm 1's prots (the rst term of the right hand side) may dom-
inate (16). In particular, given q > 0, if  is suciently small then the rst
term can be greater than (16). Similarly, for a given , if q is suciently
large then the rst term will be greater than (16). In these cases, for suf-
ciently large γH , (17) will be greater than (16), and the strategy prole
where rm 1 opposes the investigation cannot constitute an equilibrium.
Remark 2 There exists a pooling equilibrium where both types of rm 1
oppose the investigation provided that  is not too small and q and γH are
not too large.
That is, when  is relatively large, the benet to a type H rm of con-
tinuing to pool is large and when q and γH are relatively small, the cost of
pooling is small. Since the benet from pooling is greater than the cost, the
H type rm is willing to give up the possibility of eliminating the foreign
competition in order to keep rm 2 uninformed.
Signaling
In a separating or signaling equilibrium, it must either be the case that L
types support the petition and H types oppose it, or else L types oppose
the petition while H types support it.
In the rst case, if rm 2 observes non-support then Bayes rule dictates
that it should believe rm 1 to be of type L with probability zero or  = 0.
However, as we have seen from the comparative static results, the prots of
both types are decreasing in . In particular, type H rms can imitate type
L rms by supporting the investigation and be thought to be type L with
probability one. Furthermore, by supporting the petition, they also increase
the chance of a successful investigation from zero to γH . Thus type H rms
are strictly better o supporting the dumping investigation and therefore a
signaling equilibrium cannot have type L rms support while type H rms
oppose the investigation.
Remark 3 There does not exist a signaling equilibrium where type L rms
support the investigation and where type H rms oppose the investigation.
In the second case, if rm 2 observes non-support then she believes rm
1 to be of type L with probability one. A type L rm's equilibrium prots
are
L = [p(qL(1; q) + q2(1; q) + q)− cL]qL(1; q) (18)
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If a type L rm deviates by supporting the petition, rm 2 believes that rm
1 is of type H with probability 1. As a result, a type L rm 1's deviation
prots are:
L = γL[p(qL(0; 0) + q2(0; 0)) − cL]qL(0; 0)
+ (1− γL)[p(qL(0; q) + q2(0; q) + q)− cL]qL(0; q) (19)
The prots from an unsuccessful investigation (the second term of the right
hand side of (19)) is clearly dominated by (18). The prots in the event of a
successful investigation (the rst term) will dominate (18) if q is suciently
large. In this case, when γL is suciently large, a type L rm 1 will have
an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium. Thus one necessary condition
for a signaling equilibrium to exist is that q and γL should not be too large
(i.e., the cost of sending the signal is small). Note that even when q is large,
if γL is suciently small, type L rms will have no incentive to deviate.
Similarly, a type H rm's equilibrium prots are
H = γH [p(qH(0; 0) + q2(0; 0)) − cH ]qH(0; 0)
+ (1− γH)[p(qH(0; q) + q2(0; q) + q)− cH ]qH(0; q) (20)
and its deviation prots are:
H = [p(qH(1; q) + q2(1; q) + q)− cH ]qH(1; q) (21)
In this case, (21) dominates the prots from a failed investigation (the sec-
ond term in (20)). The prots from a successful investigation (the rst
term) dominates (21) if q is suciently large. In this case, provided γH is
suciently large, a type H rm will not nd it in its interest to deviate.
Remark 4 There exists a signaling equilibrium where type L rms oppose
the petition and where type H rms support it provided that q is suciently
large, γL is suciently small and γH is suciently large.
The parameters q and γH need to be large enough to ensure that high
cost rms do not have an incentive to imitate low cost rms. The parameter
γL needs to be small enough that the cost of sending the signal is less than
the benets of the signal. In the parlance of the signaling literature, signals
must be costly but the cost of the signal must be lower for \higher" types
(in our case, the \high" type is the low cost rm).
Renements
As is common with signaling games, we have a multiplicity of equilibria. As
a result, much eort has been expended in an an attempt to \rene" away
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\undesirable" equilibria (see Banks and Sobel, 1987; Cho and Kreps, 1987,
for example).
In our model, the Cho-Kreps notion of Intuitive Criterion7 can, under
certain parameter congurations, yield a unique equilibrium. In particular,
we are interested in conditions under which the signaling equilibrium is the
unique equilibrium.
To start with, note the Intuitive Criterion cannot eliminate pure sepa-
rating or signaling equilibria. To see this, notice that since in the signaling
equilibrium, there are no out-of-equilibrium actions, and therefore no out-
of-equilibrium beliefs, if an unrened signaling equilibrium exists, it always
survives the Intuitive Criterion (as well as Divinity-like renements). To see
that there are conditions under which signaling is the unique equilibrium,
note that for suciently large q and γH , a signaling equilibrium will exist
but the pooling equilibrium where both types support the petition does not
(Remarks 2 and 4).
Now consider the pooling equilibrium where both types of rms support
the investigation. The most favorable out-of-equilibrium beliefs for rm 1
are when rm 2 believes that rm 1 is of type L with probability 1 ( = 1).
The best payo attainable by a deviator under such beliefs are
t = [p(qt(1; q) + q2(1; q) + q)− ct]qt(1; q) (22)
Given that the investigation failed, this is clearly greater than the equilib-
rium prots given by the second term of equation (14). However, if q is
suciently large then the after a successful investigation, the equilibrium
prots given by the rst term of equation (14) are greater than (22). If γH
is suciently large then type H rms cannot gain by deviating, even under
the most favorable beliefs. On the other hand, if γL is suciently small, then
under these favorable beliefs, low cost rms would gain by forgoing the inves-
tigation. Thus when q is large, γL is small and γH is large, upon observing
non-support from rm 1, rm 2 must believe with probability 1, under the
Intuitive Criterion, that rm 1 is of type L. As we have just shown, given
such beliefs, a type L rm clearly has an incentive to deviate and therefore
the pooling equilibrium does not survive the Intuitive Criterion.
Proposition 1 The signaling equilibrium is the unique equilibrium that sur-
vives the Intuitive Criterion provided that q is suciently large, γL is suf-
ciently small and γH is suciently large.
Stronger renements (e.g., Divinity-like renements (Banks and Sobel,
1987; Cho and Kreps, 1987)) will eliminate the \bad" pooling equilibrium
7Stated non-technically, the Intuitive Criterion says that if there exists some type t
which cannot do better by choosing action a, under any feasible out-of-equilibrium beliefs,
then beliefs which survive the Intuitive Criterion must put probability zero on the event
that a type t agent chooses action a. Obviously this is subject to the fact that probabilities
must sum to 1 so that if no type can do better then again, any beliefs are feasible.
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and will yield unique equilibria, however, they require stronger behavioral
assumptions. Since we can obtain conditions for the uniqueness of the sig-
naling equilibrium under the relatively mild renement of the Intuitive Cri-
terion, we do not formally consider these stronger renements.
An Example
In order to see more clearly what is going on, consider a special example
where market demand is linear and given by p(Q) = a− bQ. Furthermore,
since analytic solutions are easily attainable, we now endogenize foreign
output. Assume that there is a single foreign rm with marginal cost cf . In
the event of a successful investigation, the foreign rm faces a remedial duty
of df = d > 0. In the event of an unsuccessful investigation, the foreign
rm faces a free trade duty of df = 0. For the purposes of this example,
assume that rm 2 and rm f have common out-of-equilibrium beliefs, .
Solving for the prot maximizing outputs yields:
qt =
a− cL − (1− )cH − 2ct + c2 + (df + cf )
4b
(23)
q2 =
a + cL + (1− )cH − 3c2 + (df + cf )
4b
(24)
qf =
a + cL + (1− )cH + c2 − 3(df + cf )
4b
(25)
Substituting into prots yields
t =
[a− cL − (1− )cH − 2ct + c2 + (df + cf )]2
16b
= b(qt)2
(26)
E2 =
[a + cL + (1− )cH − 3c2 + (df + cf )]2
16b
= b(q2)2
(27)
Ef =
[a + cL + (1− )cH + c2 − 3(df + cf )]2
16b
= b(qf )2
(28)
Notice that, as with the general specication, output and prots fall with
own costs and rise with rival costs. Furthermore, rm 1's output and prof-
its rise and rm 2 and rm f 's outputs and prots fall with the posterior
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probability that rm 1 is of type L. However, unlike our earlier computa-
tions, since foreign output is now endogenous, outputs and prots instead
vary with the level of duties levied on the foreign rm. In particular, the
output and prots of all domestic rms rises with the level of the duty and
foreign output and prots fall with the level of the duty. Now, changing
our notation in line with allowing foreign output to be endogenous, let the
second argument of qt(  ;  ) be the duty, df , levied on foreign imports.
In order to make prot comparisons, consider the following transforma-
tions of rm 1's expected prots from supporting the investigation. Dene
γ^t and ~γt to solve:
b[γ^tqt(s ; d
) + (1− γ^t)qt(u; 0)]2 = b[γtqt(s ; d)2 + (1− γt)qt(u; 0)2]
(29)
b[~γtqt(0; d) + (1− ~γt)qt(0; 0)]2 = b[γtqt(0; d)2 + (1− γt)qt(0; 0)2] (30)
When qt(s ; d) 6= qt(u; 0), γ^t and ~γt exist and are unique. Furthermore,
they are strictly increasing in γt with γ^t = ~γt = 1(0) when γt = 1(0).
Now consider the pooling equilibrium where rm 1 always supports the
petition. Firm 1's equilibrium prots are given by equation (14). If rm 1
deviates, the best it can do is if rm 2 believes that rm 1 is of type L with
probability 1, yielding prots bqt(1; 0)2. If
γ^Hd > [γ^H(1− s) + (1− γ^H)(1− u)](cH − cL) (31)
then b[γHqH(s ; d)2 + (1− γH)qH(u; 0)2] > bqH(1; 0)2 so that even under
the most favorable beliefs, a type H rm could never do better than its
equilibrium payo|this condition is satised for suciently large d and
suciently large γ^H . On the other hand, if
[γ^L(1− s) + (1− γ^L)(1 − u)](cH − cL)  γ^Ld (32)
then there exist beliefs under which a type L rm could do better than its
equilibrium payo|this condition can be satised if γ^L is suciently small.
Thus under such a parameter conguration, if rm 2 observed non-support,
it should believe with probability 1 that rm 1 is of type L. If equation (32)
holds with strict inequality then a rm of type L will prefer to deviate and
therefore when d and γ^H are large and γ^L is small, the pooling equilibrium
where rm 1 always supports the petition does not survive the Intuitive
Criterion.
Next, consider the pooling equilibrium where rm 1 always opposes the
petition. Firm 1's equilibrium prots are again given by equation (16).
Comparing this to (30) we see that when
~γtd > (cH − cL) (33)
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for either t = L or t = H, it will be the case that b[γtqt(0; d)2 + (1 −
γtqt(0; 0)2] > bqt(; 0)2 so that a pooling equilibrium where rm 1 always
opposes the petition does not exists. This condition is satised for rm H
when  is suciently small and when γH and d are suciently large.
Finally, consider the signaling equilibrium. As already pointed out, the
signaling equilibrium always survives the Intuitive Criterion. Furthermore,
a signaling equilibrium exists when
~γHd  cH − cL  ~γLd: (34)
In this case, it is easy to show that bqL(1; 0)2  b[γLqL(0; d)2 + (1 −
γL)qL(0; 0)2] and bqH(1; 0)2  b[γHqH(0; d)2 + (1 − γH)qH(0; 0)2] so that
neither type has an incentive to deviate. This condition is satised whenever
d and γH are suciently large and γL is suciently small.
To summarize, when d and γH are suciently large and when γL is
suciently small, i) the pooling equilibrium where rm 1 always support the
petition, does not survive the Intuitive Criterion, ii) the unrened pooling
equilibrium where rm 1 always opposes the petition fails to exist and iii)
the signaling equilibrium exists. Thus under these conditions, the signaling
equilibrium is the unique equilibrium which survives the Intuitive Criterion.
This simple example achieves two goals. First, using a concrete example
with an analytic solution, we demonstrate precise conditions under which
the signaling equilibrium is the unique Intuitive Criterion outcome. Second,
it allows us to endogenize the foreign rm's behavior to demonstrate the
innocuity of our assumption that foreign outputs are exogenously specied
and depend only on the outcome of the dumping investigation. The essential
element of this assumption being that after an armative investigation,
the foreign producers are forced to restrict their output in response to the
remedial duties.
V Observability of Respondent Stances and Pre-
play Communication
Although it is easy to nd examples of investigations where domestic re-
spondents have taken a neutral or opposed position on dumping investiga-
tions there is considerable diculty in accurately measuring the frequency
of such occurrences. In particular, a respondent's opposition can be con-
dential business information which does not appear in the public record
and is therefore unobservable to us as researchers. Sometimes overall sum-
mary statistics of positions taken by respondent rms are reported, however,
whether or not such statistics are reported varies from case to case. Thus
it is dicult to accurately gauge the frequency of \neutral" or \opposed"
positions.
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Nature
H L
Firm 1
yes no
Firm 1
yes no
I subgame I subgame
Firm 2
le don't le
I subgame I subgame
Firm 2
le don't le
Figure 2: Preplay communication game tree
This would also seem to suggest that our theory may not be very relevant.
In particular, when a rm's position is condential business information, it is
conveyed only to those with a \need to know." Petitioners and respondents
themselves do not have a \need to know" and technically do not have access
to this information. Thus it would seem that rms which oppose a petition
and ask that its opposition be condential cannot be signaling as we have
suggested. However, those with a need to know include the sta working
on the investigation, Commissioners and the counsel for the petitioners and
respondents (U.S. I.T.C., 1998, x207.7(a)(3)). A respondent's stance, while
technically condential, would be dicult to realistically keep condential.
For example, it would be dicult to prosecute a private verbal statement
by the counsel for X to the eect that \Y opposed the petition." Even
in the absence of unsanctioned private communication between counsel and
client, it seems likely that for those directly involved in the case, as the
case develops over the course of the investigation, the stances of respondent
rms would become apparent. There is thus some question as to whether
such condential business information is truly condential. In other words,
respondent rms may well ask that their stance be kept condential, knowing
that, realistically, it is not in fact condential.
Moreover, even if respondent opposition to dumping petitions is rare,
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behavior that is consistent with our predictions can occur through other
channels which are unobservable. Consider an extension to the model where
prior to the decision to le a petition, rms can costlessly communicate
in an earlier stage.8 In particular, assume that rms 1 and 2 can discuss
their intentions beforehand. For example, suppose that rm 2 is consid-
ering whether or not to le an AD petition. Recognizing the impact of
rm 1's stance on the likely outcome of the subsequent investigation, rm 2
phones rm 1 in order to gauge its position. In response to rm 2's query,
rm 1 can state either `yes' or `no.' Upon observing rm 1's response,
rm 2 updates its beliefs and then decides whether to le a dumping com-
plaint. If rm 2 les the petition then play proceeds as before. If rm 2
decides not to le a petition, then they compete given rm 2's beliefs at
this stage. Assume that participation in an investigation is costly so that if
rm 2 les the petition, rms 1 and 2 incur participation cost "1 and "2.9
Finally, assume that parameters are such that there is a unique Intuitive
Criterion signaling equilibrium in the original game. An illustration of the
preplay communication game is given in Figure 2 where the `I subgame'
refers to the continuation subgame where an investigation is conducted and
the `I subgame' refers to the continuation subgame where it is not con-
ducted. As is typical in cheap-talk games, this extended game has multiple
equilibria|communication equilibria and \babbling" equilibria.
In one communication equilibrium, rm 1 truthfully reveals its inten-
tions, stating `yes' when it plans to support the petition and `no' when it
plans to oppose it.10 Bayes consistent beliefs therefore have  = 1 when
rm 1 says `no' and  = 0 when rm 1 says `yes.' Since proceeding to an
investigation is costly, when rm 2 observes a `no' it rationally concludes
that it should not le the petition. When rm 2 observes a `yes,' it knows
that rm 1 will support its petition and rationally chooses to le the peti-
tion. Furthermore, since participation is costly, given rm 2's equilibrium
beliefs and behavior, rm 1 says `no' when it intends to oppose the petition
and `yes' when it intends to support it. In this equilibrium, the `signaling'
simply moves to an earlier stage with identical but unobservable (to the
researcher) informational consequences.
The babbling equilibrium has rm 1 stating `yes' or stating `no' in a man-
ner which is uncorrelated with its actual intentions. This is an equilibrium
because given that rm 2 believes that rm 1's statement contains no useful
8That is, we allow for cheap-talk prior to the ling decision. See Farrell and Rabin
(1996) for an overview of the literature.
9Since the International Trade Commission has subpoena power, non-participation is
not an option and rm 2 has the ability to unilaterally impose cost "1 on rm 1.
10Alternatively, there is an equilibrium where rm 1 states `no' when it plans to support
the petition and `yes' when it plans to oppose it. Furthermore, with more complicated
message spaces, other communication equilibria can occur. For example, rm 1 might say
`banana' when it intends to support the petition and `apple' when in plans to oppose it.
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information, rm 1 has no incentive to make an informative statement. Since
rm 1's statement is uncorrelated with its type, rm 2's posterior beliefs are
unchanged and therefore rm 2 les a dumping petition.
As with our original game, there is a problem with multiple equilib-
ria, however, since participation in an investigation is costly, players have
common interests and renements can pick out the communication equilib-
rium as being more reasonable (Farrell, 1993; Matthews et al., 1991; Ra-
bin, 1990). Intuitively, one expects that since the communication equilibria
Pareto dominate the babbling equilibria, informal preplay communication
will be meaningful (messages are both understood and credible) and investi-
gations will be preempted when respondents have low cost. In other words,
if an investigation is led, respondent rms always support the petition.
Since it is natural to believe that rms would attempt to communicate
prior to initiating an antidumping action, we need to reconcile the results of
this extended game with the fact that respondents are sometimes observed
opposing AD petitions. In order to do so, all that is required is weakening
the assumption that in the face of opposition, the investigation surely fails.
That is, rm 2's prior regarding the probability of a successful investigation
when rm 1 opposes the investigation should be non-zero. If this probability
is suciently large, relative to the participation cost, rm 2 will rationally
choose to go forward with the investigation, even if rm 1 could credibly
state that it plans to oppose it. Since the petitioners plan to proceed re-
gardless of their beliefs regarding rm 2's intentions, there are no longer
common interests in coordinating.11 Thus, to ensure that any signal sent
is credible, rm 2 must \put its money where its mouth is" and incur the
cost of opposing the investigation. Returning to our introductory example,
it seems unlikely that prior to ling their complaint, the petitioners did not
rst try to contact Weldbend, the most signicant domestic producer. If
the petitioners had contacted Weldbend prior to ling their petition then
one must surmise that any statements made by Weldbend were not viewed
credibly and that Weldbend had no choice but to wait for the investigation
before sending the costly signal of its type (opposing the petition).
To summarize, the possibility of unobserved preplay communication sug-
gests that signaling behavior of the sort suggested by our model may be quite
prevalent even if, in practice, opposition to AD petitions is infrequent. This
signaling can take place through \behind the scenes" discussions, prior to
the actual decision over whether or not to le the petition.
11Any preplay discussion is not credible in this case. Suppose to the contrary. In the
`I subgame,' an L rm which had convinced rm 2 that it was of type L would prefer to
support the petition. But a type H rm would then also state that they plan to oppose
the petition in the rst stage, knowing that in the `I subgame' it can instead support the
petition.
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VI Price competition
In order to consider the robustness of our conclusions, we now consider a
model of price competition.12 Suppose that instead of choosing output, rms
choose prices and that each rm's demand function is given by qi(p1; p2; pf )
for i = 1; 2 where qi is decreasing in pi and increasing in pf and pj for j 6= i.
As before, assume that foreign prices are exogenously determined and are
dependent of the outcome of the investigation. In particular, in the event
of a successful investigation, pf = p and in the event of an unsuccessful
investigation, pf = p where of course p > p. Further, for simplicity, suppose
that @q1=@p2 = @q1=@pf and @q2=@p1 = @q2=@pf . Finally, assume that
there is strategic complementarity in price setting so that @2i=@pi@pj > 0
for j 6= i.
Solving the nal stage of the model yields the expected comparative
static results. Of signicance to our analysis are the results that dt=dpf > 0
and dt=d < 0.13 As before, in the absence of information asymmetries,
if compliance is costless, rm 1 strictly prefers to support the investigation.
However, notice that rm 1 now prefers to have low  as opposed to the
earlier case of Cournot competition. That is, rm 1 would like to increase
rm 2's belief that it is a high cost rm. As we now show, signaling is
dicult to support when rms compete in prices.
Consider again whether or not there can exist a signaling equilibrium|
the potential equilibria here are i) when type L rms support the petition
and type H rms oppose it and ii) when type L rms oppose the petition
and type H rms support it.
Suppose that the rst case is an equilibrium. If rm 1 opposes the
petition, rm 2 believes with probability 1 that rm 1 is of type H. A type
H rm's equilibrium prots are:
H = [pH(0; p)− cH ]q1(pH(0; p); p2(0; p); p) (35)
In equilibrium, this must be at least as large as its deviation prots from
supporting the petition:
H = γH [pH(1; p)− cH ]q1(pH(1; p); p2(1; p); p)
+ (1− γH)[pH(1; p)− cH ]q1(pH(1; p); p2(1; p); p) (36)
Given our comparative statics, the type H rms are willing to signal only if
γH and p are relatively small. On the other hand, a type L rm's expected
12For example, using a model of Cournot competition, Brander and Spencer (1985)
showed that an export subsidy is optimal policy. However, Eaton and Grossman (1986)
subsequently showed that if rms compete instead in prices, then optimal policy will be
to tax exports.
13The remaining comparative static results are dpt=dct > 0, dpt=dct
′
> 0, dpt=dc2 >
0, dpt=dpf > 0, dpt=d < 0, dp2=dct > 0, dptdc2 > 0, dp2=dpf > 0, dp2=d < 0,
dE2=dpf > 0 and dE2=d < 0.
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prots from supporting the petition are
L = γL[pL(1; p)− cL]q1(pL(1; p); p2(1; p); p)
+ (1− γL)[pL(1; p)− cL]q1(pL(1; p); p2(1; p); p) (37)
In equilibrium these must be at least as large as its deviation prots from
opposing the petition
L = [pL(0; p)− cL]q1(pL(0; p); p2(0; p); p) (38)
Notice, that in order to support this, γL and p must be suciently large! In
particular, since γL < γH , a signaling equilibrium is dicult to support when
rms compete in prices. Unfortunately, it is impossible to draw stronger
conclusions and in fact, using linear demand functions, equilibrium prots
are quadratic in output and thus convex. Therefore, a remedial duty benets
low cost rms more than high cost rms and if the dierence is sucient, a
signaling equilibrium could exist.
The second case is far simpler. Suppose that it is an equilibrium. In this
case, if rm 1 supports the petition, the rm 2 believes with probability 1
that rm 1 is of type H. But now a rm of type L can deviate by supporting
the petition and be thought to be of type H with probability 1 and, in the
event of a successful investigation, gain the benets of an anti-dumping duty.
That is, type L rms are unambiguously better o deviating by supporting
the petition.
Thus the case of Bertrand competition, one would typically expect to
observe pooling equilibria. As with the export subsidy literature, we get
dierent results using Bertrand versus Cournot competition. However, the
contrast is not as stark. Under Bertrand competition, it appears to be
quite dicult to support a signaling equilibrium where type H rms op-
pose the dumping petition. As a result, one would typically expect pooling
behavior. Under Cournot, both pooling and signaling are possible under
plausible conditions. In other words, if a domestic producer, who does not
have signicant exports to or imports from the competing foreign countries
involved, is observed opposing a dumping petition, a plausible explanation
for this seemingly puzzling behavior is that the rm is in some sense in a
\strong" position and that it wishes to credibly convey this information to
its competitors.
VII Conclusion
Firms in imperfectly competitive markets have an interest in signaling that
they have a low cost structure so that they can increase market share and
prots. But, of course, talk is cheap and so rms must be able to credibly
demonstrate their competitiveness. If the rms are in an import-competing
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industry in which domestic competitors have led a petition for protection
from imports, not supporting the injury investigation sends the signal that
no protection is needed. Given the GATT rules on injury determination,
this behavior will lower the probability of nding injury and so reduce the
chances of tari protection. At the same time, such a rm sends a credible
signal that it is a low cost rm. Furthermore, because there may be unob-
servable communication prior to the decision to le, such signaling may be
quite prevalent even if opposition to AD petitions were readily observable
and rare.
While we have not systematically examined the extent of this behavior,
we do at least have anecdotal evidence that seems suggestive. Beyond this,
though, the model demonstrates yet another context in which laws which
aim to regulate trade can have economic consequences even when they ap-
pear not to bind. For example, a negative nding in an anti-dumping case
may appear to leave the competitive environment unaltered. But, as we have
demonstrated, the investigation itself can provide the mechanism by which
rms send credible signals to the competition and change the competitive
outcomes.
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